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Cooperative Spectrum sharing can be thought of as a reorganization of rights between stakeholders [2]. 
The principal stakeholders are the Primary User (PU), who holds the spectrum license, and the Secondary 
User(s) who uses the spectrum temporarily. Any rights management system requires a set of strategies 
and technologies to enforce the rights [3]; the timing of the enforcement action (ex-ante and ex-post) also 
plays a significant role [4].  The cooperative spectrum sharing approaches that have been proposed by the 
NTIA emphasize ex-ante actions, which are designed to prevent a PU’s signal from harmful interference 
that could occur by the SU [1, 5].  A comprehensive enforcement framework would include protecting the 
rights of the SU in addition to having an ex post component that can efficiently and effectively adjudicate 
claims of interference. Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a spectrum sharing scheme is of 
significant importance since cooperative spectrum sharing will without doubt result in interference 
events. To evaluate the role of the ex-post enforcement approach, a hypothetical scenario of using the 
recommended protection zones and the involved entities will be used to analyze the current enforcement 
timing measures and to evaluate the usage of ex-post-only enforcement measures. The hypothetical 
scenario concerns about the behaviors of the SUs, if SU-mobile devices transmitting near PU-base station 
or transmitting with high power signal within the protection zone. This behavior will cause harmful 
interference to the PU signal and data received by the PU will be lost. To guarantee SU behavior the 
suggested ex-ante and ex-post enforcement measures will be explained and analyzed. Then, ex-post-only 
enforcement measures will be applied to this scenario and analyzed. The purpose of analyzing the ex-
post-only enforcement measures is to evaluate how these measures might work, and what the limits are 
on their effectiveness. 
Introduction 
Spectrum limitation and the inefficiency of spectrum usage has led to the new approach to 
communication policy of spectrum sharing. In the US, the National Telecommunication and Information 
Administration (NTIA) offered several bands for sharing between government agencies and commercial 
wireless service providers [1].  
Spectrum sharing is a reorganization of rights between the spectrum sharing entities, and cooperation is 
one way of the coordinating spectrum sharing usage. The sharing entities are the Primary User (PU) who 
holds the spectrum license, and the Secondary User (s) who uses the spectrum temporarily. A set of 
strategies and technologies are required to enforce rights in any management system [3]. In addition, the 
timing of the enforcement action (ex-ante and ex-post) plays a significant role in such a management 
system [4].  The spectrum sharing approaches that have been proposed by the NTIA emphasize ex-ante 
actions, which are designed to prevent a PU’s signal from harmful interference that could occur by the SU 
[1, 5].  A comprehensive enforcement framework would include protecting the rights of the SU as well, in 
addition to having an ex post component that can efficiently and effectively adjudicate claims of 
interference.   
In [6] the role of ex-post enforcement was evaluated by modeling how an ex-post only enforcement 
scheme might work. A model of a geographic region with geographically distributed SUs and a single PU 
was simulated to determine whether (and when) the ex-post approach is superior to an ex-ante approach. 
Aggregate signal power of the SUs were computed at the PU’s antenna to calculate the interference level. 
We hypothesized an adjudication system would penalize the SU and that the penalty would be a fine equal 
to the value of the lost data plus the enforcement costs when the interference level reaches certain limit 
received at the PU’s antenna in the model. This type of this penalty approach is categorized as 
remunerative penalty approach. 
By following the approach that had been suggested in [6] the benefits for the PU are: (1) PU will get the 
value of the lost data and can recover it, (2) PU will gain income from sharing the spectrum within the 
excluded areas. The disadvantages that the PU might find are: (1) if the lost data cannot be recovered, (2) 
and a risk of Denial of Service (DoS) if the SUs keep transmitting near the PU-base station for a long time. 
A purely remunerative penalty function may not be the best strategy; it might not be large enough to stop 
the SU from interfering with the PU. In this paper, we construct a broader framework for evaluating the 
role of the ex-post enforcement by modeling how an ex-post only enforcement scheme might work, and 
what the limits are on its effectiveness. This work will extend the work in [6] by exploring the other 
enforcement sanctions in the cooperative spectrum sharing regime when SUs conduct harmful 
interference. There are a number of aspects to consider, including what the sanctions are and how they 
should be applied to enforce the PU’s rights.  
 This paper will study an ex-post-only enforcement to examine the role of ex-post enforcement in a 
cooperative spectrum sharing regime. A hypothetical scenario of using the recommended protection 
zones and the involved entities will be used to analyze the current enforcement timing measures and to 
evaluate the usage of ex-post-only enforcement measures. This hypothetical scenario about the behavior 
of the SUs is significant / of concern if SU-mobile devices transmit near PU-base station (earth station) or if 
they are transmitting high power signals within the protection zone. These behaviors will cause harmful 
interference to the PU signal and data received by the PU will be lost. The suggested ex-ante and ex-post 
enforcement measures will be explained and analyzed using this hypothetical scenario to see if SU 
guaranteed or not. Then, ex-post-only enforcement measures will be applied to this scenario and will be 
analyzed. The analysis of the ex-post-only enforcement measures is to evaluate how these measures might 
work, and what the limits are on their effectiveness.   
To evaluate ex-post enforcement, we hypothesize an adjudication system by an enforcer that applies 
different enforcement sanctions on the Secondary User (SU). The enforcement sanctions will depend on 
the interference level and its duration caused by the SUs transmission. We will analyze two ex-post-only 
enforcement mechanisms. First, we will analyze the remunerative penalty approach. Then we will present 
a graduated response approach. In the graduated response approach, the interference levels will be 
divided into three different interference event levels received at the PU’s antenna.  
In the first interference level, the penalty would be a fine proportional to the lost data by the PU plus the 
expected increase in enforcement costs occasioned by it. In the second interference level, when the SU 
does not optimize its transmission and decides to continue transmitting closer to the PU’s antenna, more 
punitive penalties would be applied. The SU then optimizes their transmissions so that the net value of a 
sequence of transmissions is positive. In the third interference level, if the penalty value exceeds the 
maximum limit or the SU’s interference duration exceeds a hypothesized maximum duration,   other ex-
post enforcement sanctions would be suggested like conditionally suspending SU license. We do not 
consider interference caused by “rogue” or “pirate” radios. 
There are a number of phenomena that we study in this scenario. First, as the value for SU transmissions 
increase, SU may find it valuable to risk a higher interference penalty by transmitting closer to the PU’s 
antenna. The levels of sanctions will encourage the SU to self-manage their transmission so that the value 
of a sequence of transmissions is positive and not to go through more sanctions forms that may lead them 
to lose the trust of the PU.  
While the enforcer role will be discussed in future work, the above approach assumes that the 
adjudication that is applied by the enforcer is immediate and costless. To clarify the restrictions of 
adjudication costs, it was determined that the maximum hypothetical cost level of a region was equivalent 
to an exclusion zone in ex-ante enforcement. Having completed that, we articulate the effectiveness of 
an ex-post enforcement system and its technical requirements. 
In the current static spectrum allocation, ex-ante-only measures make sense, but with a more dynamic 
spectrum sharing policy ex-post enforcement must play a role. This study will help researchers develop 
feasible approaches to adjudication and will help policymakers balance the use of ex-ante and ex-post 
enforcement techniques in spectrum sharing regimes. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 will give historical background on the spectrum sharing and 
how it was introduced. Section 3 will introduce motivation and purpose from this work. Section 4 will 
define the general aspect of enforcement and its timing. Section 5 will define spectrum sharing methods. 
Section 6 will describe the case the paper is studying. Section 7 will analyze the recommended ex-ante 
and ex-post enforcement structures. Section 8 will give an alternative scenario of using ex-post-only 
enforcement. Finally, section 9 will offer conclusions to this work.     
2. Background 
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has begun gradually adapting its policies to include 
spectrum sharing. In 2002, the Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) supported the idea of using the market 
method to utilize spectrum dynamically and efficiently [7]. In 2003, the FCC allowed the spectrum license 
holder to apply spectrum leasing options for wireless services [8]. In 2012, the President of the United 
States called for 500MHz of additional spectrum for mobile broadband [9]. The National 
Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) offered several bands to support this effort 
through spectrum sharing. These spectrum bands will be shared between Federal/non-federal and 
commercial usage. The offered bands include [1]: 
1. 1695-1710 MHz (the SU can use this band for uplink only)  
2. 1755-1780 MHz (can be paired with 2155-2180MHz) 
3. 3500- 3650 MHz (WiMax mobile stations)  
4. 4200- 4220 MHz (cannot be available before 2016)  
5. 4380- 4400 MHz (cannot be available before 2016) 
 
3. Motivation and Purpose 
In 2010, the NTIA fast track report suggested that the 1695 - 1710 MHz band can be available for spectrum 
sharing with two main restrictions [10]. First, the Signal Interference to Noise Ratio (SINR) limitation of -
10 dB that cannot be exceeded by the Secondary Users (SUs). Second, geographic limitations (called 
exclusion zones) in within which spectrum is not shared. The radii of these exclusion zones vary between 
72-121 𝑘𝑚, depending on the specific site. The lengths of the radii were given based on particular wireless 
systems used in their report. The length of the radii was established to prevent the Primary Users (PUs) 
from harmful interference. In 2013, CSMAC- WG1 recommended another geographical limitation to be 
used instead of exclusion zones which was called “protection zones” [11]. The SU could freely use the 
band outside the protection zone. SU need to coordinate with the PU (Federal organization) for using the 
band within the protection zone.  
The exclusion zones will cover heavily populated areas that may reduce the incentives of the SUs to share. 
These two restrictions are examples of ex-ante enforcement and do not consider any ex-post measures 
that might be implemented. In contrast the protection zones, which are another example of ex-ante 
measures, will allow the use of spectrum after effective coordination between the Federal and the non-
Federal organizations. The reason for using the protection zones is because the exclusion zones were 
impacting nearly thirteen percent of the United States (US) population. The radii of these protection zones 
vary between 16 - 98 𝑘𝑚, depending on the specific site. The FCC adopted the protection zones in their 
Amendment rules with regard to commercial operation [12]. The protection zones reduced that impact 
on the US population to ten percent but the dedicated protection zones will still cover heavily populated 
areas that may reduce the incentive of the SUs to share.  
In [6], an example was given to compare between using ex-post-only enforcement instead of ex-ante 
enforcement. It was found that the SU will find it beneficial to prefer ex-post-only enforcement because 
the radii of the penalty zone (no transmission zone) would be much smaller than the radii of the exclusion 
zone and therefore more users would benefit from spectrum sharing. The example was an approximation 
when implementing the ex-ante-only verses ex-post-only enforcements (see figure 1). Figure 1-a shows 
two of the exclusion zones denoted by the red circles (ex-ante enforcement only) which are Suitland, MD 
and Wallops Island, VA. These exclusion zones cover Washington, D.C. metropolitan area which is the 
seventh largest metropolitan area, and the Baltimore, MD metropolitan area. It can be seen that the PU 
will not share the band (1695 -1710MHz) within these two exclusion zones and the SUs can transmit only 
if they are outside these zones. Figure 1-b shows that when the adopted protection zone is used we can 
see that the protection zone radii for Suitland, MD is 98 km and it is impacting 3.1% of the US population. 
This protection zone also covers the Washington, DC metropolitan area and the Baltimore MD 
metropolitan area. By comparison, figure 1-c illustrates an ex-post-only enforcement scenario. Here, the 
SU transmissions are subject to a SINR limitation of -10dB and penalty if that limit is exceeded. The blue 
circles in Figure 1-c are much smaller than the exclusion zone or the protection zone. The SUs can transmit 
within these two zones too but they will be penalized. The main benefit is that spectrum can be shared in 
some major cities that are within the exclusion zones or protection zones.  
a) Ex-ante only enforcement: two of the exclusion zones 
which are Suitland, MD and Wallops Island, VA 
b) Ex-ante only enforcement: two of the protection zones 




C) Ex-post only enforcement: spectrum can be shared in all the area, and penalty zone is much smaller than exclusion zone 
 
 
Figure 1 : Comparison between the radii of the exclusion zones and penalty zones. 
In [6], the role of ex-post enforcement was evaluated by modeling how an ex-post-only enforcement 
scheme might work. A model of a geographic region with geographically distributed SUs and a single PU 
was simulated to determine whether (and when) the ex post approach is superior to an ex-ante approach. 
Aggregate signal power of the SUs were computed at the PU’s antenna to calculate the interference level. 
We hypothesized an adjudication system that penalizes the SU for when the interference level reaches 
certain limit received at the PU’s antenna. Remunerative penalty approach was used through imposing 
fines that was proportional to the lost value of the lost data by the PU plus the enforcement costs caused 
by it.  
By following the approach that had been suggested in [6] the benefits for the PU are: (1) PU will get the 
value of the lost data and can recover it, (2) PU will gain income from sharing the spectrum within the 
excluded areas. On the other hand, the disadvantages that the PU may find are: (1) if the lost data cannot 
be recovered, (2) and if the SUs keep transmitting near the PU for long time it will lead to denial of service 
(DOS) for the PU. But a purely remunerative penalty function may not be the best ex-post enforcement 
strategy, because it might not be large enough to stop the SU from interfering with the PU. 
The purpose of this paper is to construct a broader framework for evaluating the role of the ex-post 
enforcement by modeling how an ex-post-only enforcement scheme might work, and what the limits are 
on its effectiveness. This work will extend the work in [6] by exploring the other enforcement sanctions in 
the cooperative spectrum sharing regime when SUs conduct harmful interference, continuously. There 
are number of aspects to consider, including what the sanctions are and how these sanctions might be 
applied to enforce the PU’s rights.  
4. Enforcement  
In the past, the FCC assigned static spectrum bands to each user. Using this approach it was possible to 
prevent most of the interference between users. With the revolution in the telecommunications industry 
in the last two decades and the lack of spectrum bands, the federal government proposed certain bands 
to be shared [1, 7, 8] which leads to a rearrangement of rights. These new configurations of rights require 
enforcement systems if they are to be viable.     
Any rights management system requires a set of strategies and technologies to enforce the rights [3] and 
the timing of the enforcement action (ex-ante and ex-post) plays a significant role [4].  The general 
characteristics of the enforcement of rights were explained elsewhere and, was applied to spectrum 
sharing in [5]. These characteristics are [3, 5]: 1) enforcement timing action (ex-ante or ex-post); 2) form 
of the sanctions; and 3) party (ies) carrying out the enforcement.  
Shavell [4] argues that the timing of the enforcement action plays an important role in any enforcement 
regime. Enforcement actions can take place before (potential) interference events (ex-ante enforcement), 
or afterward (ex-post enforcement).  
The spectrum sharing approaches that have been proposed by the NTIA emphasize ex-ante actions, which 
are designed to prevent a PU’s signal from harmful interference that could occur by the SU [1, 5].  A 
comprehensive enforcement framework would include protecting the rights of the SU as well, in addition 
to having an ex post component that can efficiently and effectively adjudicate claims of interference.   
As mentioned, practical enforcement schemes have ex-ante and ex-post enforcement that are linked 
together. Thus, the enforcement system will consist of: 1) ex-ante enforcement; 2) ex-post enforcement; 
3) enforcer.  
4.1 Ex-ante enforcement 
Ex-ante enforcement procedures consist of prevention mechanisms that shape the activity before the 
harmful interference occurs. Examples of ex-ante enforcement are the exclusion zones, protection zones 
and the SINR limitations. Regulators prefer using an exclusion zone to prevent harmful interference 
because this is less complicated than other ex-ante enforcement mechanisms. A protection zone is 
another ex-ante enforcement mechanism but costs more because it requires coordination between the 
sharing entities when transmitting within the zone.  
4.2 Ex-post enforcement  
In telecommunications industry, the ex-post enforcement consists of corrective measures after a violation 
event has occurred. The corrective measures may include penalties (such as fines, product recall, or 
revocation of licenses) or modifications of rights between parties or other kinds of sanctions (e.g., power 
penalties, transmission moratoriums, etc.) such as in [20, 21].  
The definition of penalty according to The Law Dictionary1 is: “A punishment; a punishment imposed by 
statute as a consequence of the commission of a certain specified offense“. So, penalties are important in 
the telecommunications industry because (1) they encourage the violator not to impose harmful 
interference, (2) encourage the violator to look for alternatives to decrease the probability of a violation 
[13].    
Generally, there are two approaches to determining penalties: remunerative and punitive. The punitive 
penalty means that if a breach event (such as harmful interference) occurs, the violator will pay much 
more than the real value of the breach (value of the lost data from harmful interference event). By 
contrast, a remunerative penalty seeks to compensate the injured for the value of the loss due the breach 
event. 
Penalties could include fines only or fines and forfeiture. Imposing fines upon illegal offenders stems from 
the ancient Anglo-Saxon tradition of extracting payment from families and sometimes whole communities 
for the commission of criminal acts [15]. The term “fine” is defined as a financial penalty enforced in illegal 
matters [14]. In the United States (US), fines are usually designated for particular offenses; because of 
existing statues they are restricted to minimum and maximum amounts. As an example, a fine for 
speeding in an automobile must fall between $30 and $300.  
The Communications Act of 19342  regulates harmful interference in the telecommunications industry and 
this Act rules have been used to apply to the present day practice of spectrum sharing. The Act imposes a 
base value for fines depending on the violation; it also sets maximum limits depending on the nature of 
the offense according to section five of the Act. Section five dictates the penalties when conducting 
harmful interference by any individuals [15]. The penalty levels vary depending on the degree of the 
violation or level of harm. If it causes harm to another entity the general penalty is a fine of no more than 
$10,000 (section 501). In the case of violating the rules or the regulations of the Communications Act of 
1934, the violator will be punished with a fine of no more than $500 for each and every day of the breach 
(section 502).  
In the case of repeating harmful interference, the penalty is upgraded to a forfeiture penalty based on the 
Communication Act of 1934. The FCC uses Forfeiture Proceedings 3 to issue additional penalties according 
to the Communications Act of 1934. For the purpose of this paper, we are going to explore different 
measures such as punitive penalty and conditionally suspending spectrum license.  
 
                                                            
1 What is Penalty?: http://thelawdictionary.org/penalty/, (accessed on April 29, 2015) 
2 Communications Act of 1934 (last visited 8/2/15): https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf  
3 Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines (last visited 8/2/15): http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=6c4588fbf26be630b7d3ce1862fbee3e&mc=true&node=se47.1.1_180&rgn=div8  
4.3 Enforcer 
The role of the enforcer would be to detect, adjudicate, and control parties’ behaviors. The enforcer must 
be trusted by all the entities of the system and must have authority to resolve enforcement violation 
events [16]. The parties could elect the enforcer to resolve both the acceptability of a hypothetical 
violation event and its costs [16].   
In the US, telecommunications agencies can be divided into two types: federal agencies and non-federal 
commercial agencies. Each type of agency has a different enforcer (entity) to govern spectrum usage. NTIA 
has authority over federal spectrum users but has no authority over non-federal users. Conversely, the FCC 
governs non-federal spectrum use but has no authority over federal spectrum users [15]. As a result, a legal 
framework for implementing an enforcement function must be developed.  
5. Spectrum Sharing 
Spectrum can be shared in three dimensions which are spatial dimension, frequency, and time. Spectrum 
can also be shared in any combination of those dimensions. Static spectrum allocation means a spectrum 
user will have exclusive rights to the spectrum when the spectrum is not being shared in at least one of 
those dimensions.  
The current wireless networks are defined by a static allocation policy that has been regulated by the 
government since the 1920s [12]. That policy lead to lack of spectrum in particular spectrum bands and 
the spectrum usage was concentrated on a certain portion of the assigned spectrum. This resulted in to a 
large amount of the assigned spectrum being unutilized. The limited available spectrum and the 
insufficiency in the spectrum usage required a new communications standard policy that could offer new 
ways of exploiting the available spectrum. Spectrum sharing was proposed to solve these issues.   
Spectrum sharing can be viewed as a readjustment of rights among stakeholders [1]. The FCC started to 
move toward spectrum sharing and changing its strategies toward spectrum allocation gradually. In 2002, 
the Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) supported the idea of using the market method to utilize spectrum 
dynamically and efficiently. In 2003, the FCC allowed the spectrum license holder to apply spectrum 
leasing options for wireless services. In 2012 [10] the President of the United States called for 500MHz of 
spectrum for mobile broadband. To ease spectrum sharing, (NTIA) offered several bands, previously 
mentioned in the background section of this paper [1].  
5.1 Spectrum Sharing Methods 
There are a variety of methods to manage spectrum sharing between entities. The sharing entities are the 
license holder (or the spectrum incumbent) who is referred to as the primary user (PU) and the secondary 
user (SU) who is using the spectrum temporarily. Weiss and Lehr [12] presented a taxonomy of sharing 
depends on the presence of explicit coordination of usage (figure 2). The Cooperative sharing, which is 
the primary focus of this paper, depends on the coordination between users. The sharing coordination 
could be between PU and SU users or between SU users themselves. Non-Cooperative sharing, applies 
when there is no coordination between users. Cooperative and Non-Cooperative parties have two types 
of sharing: Primary and Secondary.  Primary sharing means all users have equal rights whether they are 
sharing the spectrum (i.e. using WiFi) or using it for the secondary spectrum market. Secondary Sharing 
means there is no coordination between PU and SU but there could be coordination between SUs via 
medium access control (MAC) protocol. 
 
Figure 2: ways of Spectrum Sharing 
6. Case Description  
We will focus on the 1695 - 1710 MHz band in this paper because enables a clear exposition of enforcement 
concepts; other bands will be studied in future. The PU of 1695 - 1710 MHz band is the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) using this band for the downlink from the Federal 
Meteorological Satellite (MetSat). The PU is using this band for the downlink from satellite to base stations 
to receive weather data. PU’s base stations are fixed, not mobile. The Secondary Users (SU) for this band 
will be non-federal commercial organizations. The SU is assumed to be an LTE operator who will be using 
this band for uplink from the handsets to the base station. The band will be shared between PU and SUs.   
A Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee counsels NTIA on a wide range of spectrum 
policy matters. CSMAC-Working Group 1 (CSMAC-WG1) was charged with developing recommendations 
for the use of the 1695 - 1710 MHz band. These recommendations will be toward commercial services and 
protecting federal meteorological earth stations from harmful interference. CSMAC-enforcement 
subcommittee concerns with the enforcement rules of spectrum sharing [15].   
In 2013, CSMAC recommended that the protection zones be used instead of the exclusion zones with the 
same SINR limitation that had been suggested in the NTIA fast track report in 2010.  Then the FCC adopted 
the protection zones in its Amendment rules with regard to commercial operation in 2014 [12]. The SU 
could freely use the band outside the protection zone. The SU need to coordinate with the PU (federal 
organization) for using the band within the protection zone. And this coordination will need an enforcer 
to govern spectrum sharing enforcement rights. 
The behavior of the SUs is significant because of the danger it poses for harmful interference. If SU-mobile 
devices transmit close to a PU-earth station or transmit a high power signal within the protection zone, 
harmful interference to the PU signal may occurs, resulting in the possible loss of PU data. The impact of 
losing such data might be very high in case of weather emergency. 
 Figure 3: Spectrum sharing entities and sharing scenarios using protection zone  
Figure 3 shows our hypothetical scenario using the protection zones and the involved entities. This 
hypothetical scenario will be used throughout the paper to analyze the current enforcement timing 
measures and to evaluate the usage of ex-post-only enforcement measures. This hypothetical scenario 
demonstrates the potential concerns/consequences of an SU-mobile device transmitting data or a high 
power signal near the PU earth station within the protection zone. To avoid this outcome, the suggested 
ex-ante and ex-post enforcement measures will be explained and analyzed. Then, ex-post-only 
enforcement measures will be applied to this scenario and analyzed to evaluate how these measures might 
work, and the limitations on their effectiveness.   
Figure 3 shows three entities will be involved in spectrum sharing: the PU, a single SU mobile operator, 
and an enforcer. The band will be shared between PU and SUs. PU will be an earth base station and will be 
using this band for a downlink signal from the satellite. The Secondary User (SU) is a non-federal 
commercial agency that is assumed to be an LTE operator. In figure 3, we can see that an SU-mobile device 
outside the protection zone can use the band as an uplink to an SU-base station as link (1), or it can use 
the band to communicate with other SU’s mobile devices as a link (2) to cooperate with other SUs. Within 
the protection zone we assume that only Cooperative Primary Spectrum sharing between PU and single 
SU will be used. The enforcer role is to coordinate between the PU and SUs to guarantee their behaviors. 
The enforcer will need to detect the interference events that affect the PU’s received signal and are caused 
by the SU’s uplink signal. To do this a sensing system will need to be built around the PU earth station.      
 6.1 Ex-ante enforcement in Cooperative Spectrum Sharing 
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommended that the NTIA along with the FCC identify the ex-
ante measures of the operational and technical guidelines governing the spectrum sharing of Federal 
Government (“Federal Government” does not need to be capitalized) bands. These guidelines include 
interference mitigation and enforcement procedures to provide ample precision for PUs and prospective 
SUs [15]. So, the ex-ante enforcement that will be applied to the spectrum sharing are 1) protection zones; 
2) SINR limitation of -10 dB to establish the interference threshold for the receivers of the PU’s receiver 
(metrological-satellite earth station’s receiver).   
 
6.2 Ex-post enforcement in Cooperative Spectrum Sharing 
The ex-post enforcement consists of corrective measures after harmful interference has occurred. The 
corrective measures may include penalties (such as fines, product recall, or revocation of spectrum 
sharing licenses) or modifications to spectrum sharing rights between PUs and SUs. 
Ex-post enforcement measures in spectrum sharing cases are different because the spectrum is going to 
be shared between Federal/non-federal and commercial usage. And each type of these agencies has a 
different entity to govern the spectrum usage. Those entities each have different ex-post measures. The 
entity that governs the Federal spectrum users is the NTIA but has no authority over non-federal users. 
Conversely, the FCC governs non-federal uses but has no authority over federal spectrum users [15]. That 
is why we see differences in ex-post enforcement measures between NTIA and the FCC.  
The FCC has a variety of ex-post enforcement measures such as Notice of Apparent Liability and penalties. 
As previously mentioned, penalties may play an important role in spectrum sharing because (1) they deter 
the violator from conducting harmful interference; (2) encourage the violator to look for alternatives 
thereby decreasing the probability of repeated harmful interference [13]. The FCC penalties such as fines, 
forfeitures, cease and desist orders, equipment seizures and in the most extreme cases criminal penalties. 
In addition, the FCC governmental procedure consists of technical rights, as well as trials, in advance 
penalties are confirmed [15]. NTIA ex-post enforcement measures are different than the FCC because it 
is dealing with federal agencies. NTIA has the authority to modify and revoke Federal licenses. 
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee report recognized the differences and difficulty of relying on one 
entity (NTIA or FCC) to govern if a harmful interference event occurred between PU and SUs [15]. It 
recommended that NTIA and the FCC enter into a new central Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to 
govern spectrum sharing rights between federal and non-federal users. By central MOU, federal and non-
federal entities would rely on both the FCC and NTIA to take necessary actions in the event there is a breach 
of a sharing agreement. The central MOU would combine both agencies’ ex-post enforcement measures 
and apply them when SU is transmitting within the protection zones. By using the central MOU 1) SUs will 
depend on NTIA authority to take action against the PU in the event there is a breach of spectrum sharing 
arrangement; 2) and PU will rely on the FCC authority to enforce spectrum sharing rights over SUs. CSMAC-
enforcement subcommittee report also recommended that both PU and SUs enter into specific MOU to 
cover all specific interference concerns regarding spectrum sharing rights.   
6.3 Enforcer 
The enforcer would govern PU and SU behaviors to 1) guarantee spectrum sharing rights are enforced; 2) 
and guarantee that PU will not receive any harmful interference signals from the SU. The enforcer would 
need to detect the interference events that affect the PU’s received signal and are caused by the SU’s 
uplink signal. A sensing system would need to be built around the PU (which is an Earth Base Station in 
this model). The sensor network would then detect the aggregate signal energy attributable to the SU. 
The sensor antennas would have a range equal to the protection zone ranges (16- 98 𝑘𝑚) depending on 
the specific site. If the signal energy is below noise level, it would not be detectable. If the signal energy 
reaches the noise level, interference would be detected and the enforcer will apply the ex-post 
enforcement measures recommended by the central MOU, such as penalizing the SU. Details about the 
enforcer role and sensing its mechanisms, are matters for future work and will not be discussed here.  
Commented [MW1]: An enforcer can’t actually make this 
guarantee!   
6.4 Violating Spectrum Sharing Rights 
In case one of the sharing entities violates the rule of spectrum sharing, the enforcer would use both 
central MOU and specific MOU that integrate NTIA and FCC ex-post enforcement measures. In the event 
the PU violates spectrum sharing rights, the enforcer could apply the NTIA corrective measures, such as 
modification, and revoke federal licenses of the PU. And if the SU violates any spectrum sharing rights by 
conducting harmful interference, the Communications Act of 19344 would be used to regulate this event 
by using a section 5 Forfeiture penalty SU would be classified as a common carrier because it is an LTE 
operator (non-federal commercial agency). The maximum forfeiture amount per harmful interference or 
per day for a continuing interference is $160,000. If the harmful interference continued by SU involving 
single act or failure to act, the statute limits of forfeiture penalty for SU is going to be $1,575,000.         
In addition to these fines, central MOU would use and integrate Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines5 used 
by the FCC to issue penalties in addition to any other penalty provided by the Communications Act of 
1934. The guidelines would be used to issue no forfeiture at all, a higher or lower forfeiture than provided 
in the Communications Act of 1934, or to apply alternative or additional sanctions as permitted by the 
statute.  
Based on Buckley6 and Acumen7 cases, we hypothesis that the forfeiture penalty consists of three factors 
which are 1) the base amount forfeiture expense for transmitting close to PU-base station and exceeding 
the power limits; 2) base forfeiture expense for interference; 3) and upward or downward adjustment 
factor. The base amount forfeiture expense for transmitting near a PU base station and exceeding the 
power limits is $4,000. The base forfeiture expense amount for interference is $7,000. The downward or 
upward adjustment factor depends on the violation act and it relies on section 503 (b)(2)(E) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 to consider the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violations 
and with respect to the violator, the degree of liability, any history of prior violations, capability to pay, 
and such other measures as justice requires. Therefore, the adjustment factors regarding the severity of 
the violation that may increase or decrease the forfeiture such as substantial harm, repeated or 
continuous violation, or substantial or economic gain derived from the violation, and the minor nature of 
the violation. 
7. Analysis of the recommended Ex-ante and Ex-post Enforcements  
7.1 Ex-ante enforcement  
The two ex-ante measures that have been recommended are 1) protection zones, 2) and the Signal 
Interference to Noise Ratio (SINR) limitation of -10 dB that cannot be exceeded by SUs. The main reason 
for using the protection zones instead of exclusion zones was the population impact in the US.  The 
previous recommendation of using exclusion zones would affect thirteen percent of the US population 
but using the protection zones reduced that impact to ten percent of the US population. When using the 
                                                            
4 Communications Act of 1934 (last visited 8/2/15): https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf  
5 Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines (last visited 8/2/15): http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=6c4588fbf26be630b7d3ce1862fbee3e&mc=true&node=se47.1.1_180&rgn=div8  
6 FCC Forfeiture Order for Mr. Drew Buckley, Bay Shore, NY (last visited 7/21/2015): 
https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2014/DA-14-880A1.html   
7 FCC Forfeiture Order for Acumen Communication (Acumen), Los Angeles, California (last visited 
8/2/15):https://www.fcc.gov/document/17k-nal-acumen-unauthorized-operation-and-harmful-interference 
protection zone, the SU could freely use the band outside the protection zone. SU need to coordinate 
with the PU for using the band within the protection zone. The protection zones allow the use of spectrum 
within the zone after effective coordination between the PU and SUs. The radii of these protection zones 
vary between 16-98 𝑘𝑚, depending on the specific site.  
However, the impact on the US population was not solved in the use of the protection zones. And still the 
dedicated protection zones will cover heavily populated areas that may reduce the incentives of the SUs 
to share. As an example, one of the protection zones is Suitland, MD and the recommended radii is 98 km. 
It covers the Washington, DC metropolitan area which is the seventh largest metropolitan area, and 
Baltimore, MD metropolitan area. This protection zone only impacts 3.1% of the US population, but is 
significant because it will affect the methods of spectrum sharing within protection zones. The only 
method that is allowed to be used within the protection zones is the Cooperative Primary Spectrum 
Sharing. 
7.2 Ex-post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing 
Ex-post enforcement is needed in spectrum sharing to control the behavior of the sharing entities. So, if 
the SU violates the spectrum sharing agreement by conducting harmful interference, the PU will rely on 
the FCC’s ex-post enforcement measures to stop the SU from continuing or repeating this violation. The 
FCC has a variety of ex-post enforcement measures such as Notice of Apparent Liability and penalties. FCC 
relay on the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate harmful interference event by using a Forfeiture 
Proceedings guidelines8.  The Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines are used to issue no forfeiture at all, a 
higher or lower forfeiture than provided in the Communications Act of 1934, or to apply alternative or 
additional sanctions as permitted by the statute depending on other factors. 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑂𝑝 + 𝐼 ± 𝐴𝑑𝑗 − − − − − (1) 
Equation (1) is the forfeiture penalty which consists of three factors: 1) 𝑂𝑝 is the base amount forfeiture 
expense for transmitting near to PU base station and exceeding the power limits; 2) 𝐼 is base forfeiture 
expense for interference; 3) and ±𝐴𝑑𝑗 is upward or downward adjustment factor. The base amount 
forfeiture expense for transmitting near PU base station and exceeding the power limits is $4,000. The 
base forfeiture expense amount for interference is $7,000. The downward or upward adjustment factor 
depends on the violation act and it rely on section 503 (b)(2)(E) of the Communications Act of 19349 to 
consider the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violations and with respect to the violator, 
the degree of liability, any history of prior violations, capability to pay, and such other measures as justice 
require. Therefore, the adjustment factors regarding the severity of the violation that may increase or 
decrease the forfeiture such as substantial harm, repeated or continuous violation, or substantial or 
economic gain derived from the violation, and the minor nature of the violation. Based on the 
Communications Act of 1934, the forfeiture penalty can be upgraded until it reaches the maximum limit. 
The maximum forfeiture amount per harmful interference or per day for a continuing interference is 
$160,000. If the harmful interference continued by SU involving single act or failure to act, the statute 
limits of forfeiture penalty for SU is going to be $1,575,000.  
                                                            
8 Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines (last visited 8/2/15): http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=6c4588fbf26be630b7d3ce1862fbee3e&mc=true&node=se47.1.1_180&rgn=div8  
9 Communications Act of 1934 (last visited 8/2/15): https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf  
The issue with these ex-post enforcement measures that had been used by the NTIA and FCC are based 
on the Communications Act of 1934, these ex-post enforcement measures are suitable for static spectrum 
allocation policy but may not be applicable for spectrum sharing policy and might reduce the incentives 
for the SU to share the spectrum because of the following: 
1- Regulation  
a. They are based on the Communications Act of 1934 Section 302(1) (transfer the authority to the 
FCC to govern the likely interference of devices but it did gave the authority for FCC or NTIA to 
give this authority to a trusted third party). 
b. They are more generic. 
c. They are more punitive than corrective measures for individual cases.  
d. There is no alternative to the Forfeiture Proceeding guidelines when harmful interference event 
occurs that the enforcer can follow. 
2- Technically: The band is dedicated for the uplink communication from SU-mobile devices to SU-base 
station. SU is a mobile operator and cannot control the mobility of the SU-mobile devices. If an SU-
mobile device moved close to the PU’s base station and tried to communicate with SU-base station, 
it might affect receipt of the satellite signal for PU and lead to harmful interference. The consequences 
for that would be implemented by the enforcer, who would follow the FCC Forfeiture guidelines by 
forfeiting the mobile devices and applying the forfeiture penalty to the SU.  
a. If this happened once, the enforcer might go with no forfeiture at all or have the authority 
upgrade the forfeiture penalty until it reach the maximum amount of $160,000 but that is not 
explained well in the CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommendation. 
b. If it occurred a second time in the same day, the enforcer would have the authority to upgrade 
the forfeiture penalty to the maximum amount of $160,000. 
c. If the violation occurred for the second time in another day, the enforcer would have the authority 
to upgrade the forfeiture penalty up to the maximum amount of $1,575,000. 
d. Sometimes the SU-mobile devices transmit a signal with high power to communicate with the SU-
base station till it receives a signal from the SU-base station to lower its power. If the SU-mobile 
device is transmitting near PU’s base station that would lead to harmful interference and the 
enforcer might follow the procedure that had been mentioned in the previous point.  
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommended that PU and SU enter into specific MOU or 
individual agreement to cover all specific interference enforcement issues [15]. The specific MOU would 
framework enforcement rights and proper penalties of the sharing parties. This recommendation will not 
be an ideal solution because it will be under the umbrella of the Communications Act of 1934 and the 
Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines. In addition, the Forfeiture Proceeding guidelines did not take into 
consideration the time period of conducting the harmful interference. The time period of the interference 
is needed to impose the proper penalty to cover the value of lost data. The Forfeiture Proceeding did not 
put into consideration the number of the interferer because it was based on the static spectrum policy 
and the interference cases were rare.  
Alternatively, CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee could be more specific and recommend that PU and SU 
enter into specific MOU to cover other ex-post enforcement (interference remedies) that are related to 
spectrum sharing. Ex-post enforcement that are not included in the Communication Act of 1934 such as 
other types of penalties (fines) against the interferer such as remunerative or punitive penalties 
depending on the level and time of the interference. The following sections will evaluate the scenarios of 
using those two approaches in the spectrum sharing regime to find which is better approach that could 
be used.      
8. Alternative Scenarios   
8.1 Ex-post enforcement only- Remunerative Penalty Approach  
In [6] the role of ex-post-only enforcement using a remunerative penalty approach shows the regulator 
how an ex-post-only enforcement scheme might work. A model of a geographic region with geographically 
distributed SUs and a single PU was simulated to determine whether (and when) the ex-post approach is 
superior to an ex-ante approach. Aggregate signal power of the SUs were computed at the PU’s antenna 
to calculate the interference level. It hypothesized an adjudication system that penalizes the SU for when 
the interference level reaches certain limit received at the PU’s antenna. A remunerative penalty approach 
was used which means a fine was imposed on the SU that was proportional to the lost value of the lost 
data by the PU plus the enforcement costs caused by it. The remunerative penalty was imposed for each 
SU-mobile device’s conduct harmful interference to the PU’s received signal and considered the time 
period for the interference. 
 
Figure 4: Spectrum sharing entities and sharing scenarios using ex-post enforcement- remunerative approach 
Figure 4 shows the hypothetical scenario used in [6] of using ex-post-only enforcement. Three entities 
involved in spectrum sharing which were PU, single SU mobile operator, and an enforcer. The band would 
be shared between PU and SUs. PU would be an earth base station and it would be using this band for 
downlink signal from the satellite. The Secondary Users (SU) is a non-federal commercial agencies which is 
assumed to be LTE operator. SU used this band for uplink from the handsets to the SU’s base station. The 
enforcer role was to govern the spectrum sharing rules between the PU and SUs to guarantee their 
behaviors. The enforcer would need to build sensors around the PU’s base station to detect the 
interference events that affect the PU’s received signal and are caused by the SU’s uplink signals.  The 
sensor’s antenna would have a range to detect the interference events with probability of detection, called 
a penalty zone. The PU would share the spectrum within the suggested exclusion zones if (1) the SUs agreed 
on the spectrum sharing rights that included the SINR limits of -10 dB and (2) if any interference event 
occurred the SUs would be penalized by the enforcer. The SU would not be penalized as long as its 
interfering signal does not exceed the interference limits (-10 dB). 
The penalty function in [6] was built on Polinsky and Shavell [18] argument that ex-post enforcement costs 
has two types which are unchangeable enforcement costs and changeable enforcement costs. 
Unchangeable enforcement costs are the costs that do not depend on the number of interferer which is 
the value of the transmission loss due to interference. Changeable enforcement costs depends on the 
number of SUs that go beyond the interference limits, such as costs of penalizing the interferer and 
collecting penalties. Equation (2) represents the remunerative penalty function that is imposed by the 
enforcer to each SU-mobile device exceeds the SINR limits. The enforcer charges a Penalty to the SU that 
recovers PU’s (1) transmission loss due to interference ($𝐼) for the time 𝑡 and (2) the changeable 
enforcement costs ($𝐶) which represents the costs of imposing and collecting the penalties (3) all 
multiplied by a probability of detection (𝛼) because the number of interference events depend on this 
probability.  Undetected interference should not increase the penalty. The PU cannot know for certain 
what α is, so it is a private estimate.  It could adjust the Penalty ($𝐼) by 𝛼, but not the changeable cost 
($𝐶). The penalty function will be as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 = 𝛼(𝐼 × 𝑡 +  𝐶) − − − − − −(2) 
So, the SU can decide to transmit or not based on: 
- Its estimation of received aggregate signal power at PU or SINR limits of ≥ -10dB by benefiting 
from the use of propagation model. 
- Its estimates of probability of detection (𝛼) (presumably SU knows the values of changeable and 
unchangeable enforcement costs. If the value of transmission is greater than or equal the 
Remunerative Penalty, the SU will transmit. 
- Otherwise, if the value of transmission is less than the Remunerative Penalty, the SU will not 
transmit.  
 
Figure 5: comparison between suggested exclusion zone and Penalty zone 
By following the approach in [6], a simple model of geographic region with geographically distributed SUs 
and single PU was built. Figure 5 shows a comparison between the suggested exclusion zone in the NTIA 
fast track report [1] with a length of 90𝑘𝑚 and a penalty zone. It was assumed that 100,000 SUs were 
uniformly distributed in the area of 90𝑘𝑚 × 90𝑘𝑚. The interference limit of -10dB was used to build the 
penalty zone with a range of 13.4𝑘𝑚 (see Appendix A for more detail about the propagation model and 
other assumptions). Figure 5-b shows that the penalty zone range was smaller than the exclusion zone 
































































b) SU are distributed in 90 kmx90 km, 1.821% of the SU will be penalized
 
 
SINR limit=-10dB => Penalty Zone r=13.4031 km
and even smaller than the recommended protection zone since the smallest suggested protection zone is 
16𝑘𝑚.  
The benefits of using ex-post-only with remunerative approach that had been suggested in [6] for the PU 
are: (1) PU will get the value of the lost data and can recover it, (2) PU will gain income from sharing the 
spectrum within the excluded areas, (3) the cost of building the sensors around the PU’s base station to 
detect harmful interference is less than the one for protection zones because it would have a smaller 
range. The disadvantages that the PU may find are: (1) if the lost data cannot be recovered; (2) this 
approach would not stop the SU from conducting harmful interference to PU because as the value for SU 
transmissions increase, SU may find it valuable to risk a higher interference penalty by transmitting closer 
to the PU’s antenna; (3) if the SUs keep transmitting near the PU for an extended period of time it would 
lead to denial of service (DOS) for the PU; (4) and imposing the penalties depend on the probability of 
detection. So if the probability of detection is 50%, the SU will be detected once every two times of 
conducting harmful interference and that means PU will get paid once instead of two events of losing 
data.  
8.2 Ex-post enforcement only- Punitive Penalty Approach 
To overcome these disadvantages the enforcer could use punitive penalties. The same hypothetical 
scenario will be used on figure 4 of using ex-post-only enforcement but with punitive penalty approach. 
The punitive penalty will be imposed for each SU-mobile device’s conduct harmful interference to the 
PU’s received signal and considered the time period for the interference. The main reason from using 
punitive penalty is to deter the SU from conducting harmful interference on the PU receiving signals which 
will lead to loss of data. So when constructing the punitive penalty function, the enforcer and the sharing 
entities have to put in consideration of under deterrence or over deterrence. 
As mentioned, a punitive penalty approach means the value of the fine is much higher than the value of 
PU’s lost data. Polinsky and shavell Shavell [19] argued that Punitive punitive damages ordinarily should 
be awarded if, and only if, a person who cause harm has a chance of escaping responsibility for the harm 
causescaused. In the spectrum sharing regime, the enforcer will detect the interference events by using a 
sensor antennas. These sensors antenna will have a sufficient range to detect the interference events with 
probability of detection (𝛼). So, the condition of using punitive penalty becomes valid in our hypothetical 
scenario. Polinsky and Shavell [19] argued that if the SU has a chance of not being detected, the suitable 
level of total loss to impose on them (if SU-mobile device is detected) is the value of the lost data 
multiplied by the equivalent of the probability of detection. Thus if the value of the lost data is $1,000 and 
the probability of detection is 50% which means that there is a 50% chance that interferer SU-mobile 
device will found responsible, the penalty fine should be multiplied by the damage/0.5, or twice the 
damage, or 2. So the total punitive penalty value should be $2,000 which is the value of the lost data 
$1,000 plus the punitive costs of $1,000in this example. Because the SU will pay this value every second 
time SU-mobile devices generate harmful interference. Similarly, if the probability of detection is 25%, 
punitive penalty should be $4,000 (the value of the lost data $1,000 multiplied by 4). They defined the 
ideal level of punitive costs should be equal to the value of the lost data multiplied by a punitive factor. 
The punitive factor can be represented as the ratio between of the probability of detection over and the 
probability of escaping. So, the punitive penalty function will consist of two values: which are the value of 
the lost data and the value of the punitive costs.        
𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 = ($𝐼 × 𝑡 + $𝐶) + 𝑎𝑑𝑗 − − − − − − − − − (3) 
Equation (3) represents the punitive penalty function that is imposed by the enforcer to each SU-mobile 
device exceeds the SINR limits. The punitive penalty function consists of two fields added together. The 
first field, is representing the value of the unchangeable enforcement cost ($𝐼) multiplied by the time (𝑡) 
and changeable enforcement costs ($𝐶). The second field, represent the adjustment factor (𝑎𝑑𝑗). The 
function of the adjustment factor could be linearly, or exponentially calculated.  
 
Figure 6: Remunerative Penalty vs. Punitive Penalties with different adjustment factors 
The punitive penalty function should guarantee that the SU will pay the value of the lost data lost that 
had been causeddue to from the harmful interference, thus take suitable provisions for not conducting 
harmful interference. Figure 6 shows a comparison between the remunerative penalty and punitive 
penalty with different ways of calculating the adjustment factors. The result is calculated when there is 
one SU-mobile device is exceeding the SINR limit and causing loss of the receiving the PU’s signal. The 
value of the lost data and the changeable enforcement costs were chosen to be equal10. We can see that 
the SU penalty will be much higher than the value of the lost data when as the probability of detection is 
getting smallerdecreases. We can see that when the probability of detection is less than 25% with the 
punitive penalty function, it will may be preferable to use a linear adjustment factor that is equal to 
punitive factor multiplied by the value of the lost data because the other two approaches would be 
considered as to be over over-deterrence. Also, if the probability of detection is less than 55%, it will be 
preferable not to use the natural exponential function for the same reason.  The issue of using ex-post 
enforcement with punitive penalty approach only, it would not stop the SU from repeat conducting 
                                                            
10 To estimate the lost data value, we use the cost to receive 1MHz from a satellite link as a proxy. Our research has shown that building, launching, 
and operating a new satellite with 15 transponders for ten years will cost around $300 million (http://www.satsig.net/ivsatcos.htm). The cost of 
leasing a transponder costs approximately $2million per year. The transponder bandwidth is 36MHz, which means that this 1 MHz lease cost is 
approximately $0.0018 per second. To estimate the duration of an interference event, we assume that this would be the average length of an SU 
session.  For a voice call, this would be 2 min, for a data session, this would be the duration of a session.  We will go with 2 min as a starting point, 
so this would be 0.0018*2*60. The SU will use the 15MHZ bandwidth which means that (0.0018*2*60*15) the value of the lost data for each 
interfering event will cost $3.24. Although, we will assume that the maximum changeable enforcement cost that can be reached in this study is 
$3.24 to make it more feasible for the reader.   
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harmful interference to PU. Because the SU can repeat the violation act as long as the penalty is fine and 
not upgraded.    
8.3 Ex-post enforcement only- Graduated Response Penalty Approach 
But a purely remunerative penalty function nor punitive penalty as an ex-post-only enforcement may not 
be the best strategy because it might not be large enough to stop the SU from interfering with the PU. A 
broader framework for evaluating the role of the ex-post-only enforcement would be a better approach 
to stop the SU from conducting harmful interference to the PU. There are number of aspects to consider, 
including what the sanctions are and how these should be applied to enforce the PU’s rights.  
We hypothesize an adjudication system by an enforcer that applies different enforcement sanctions on 
the Secondary User (SU). The enforcement sanctions would be upgraded gradually in response to the SU’s 
interfering behavior. The graduated response idea is used in the Internet for Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) to check, conditionally suspend, or disconnect internet access to a subscriber who had received three 
warning letters of alleged copyright infringement. The idea came from the baseball rule of “three strikes 
and you are out” and at the start it was known as “three strikes” [17]. The graduated response approach 
is used in UK, France and other countries.   
Response Power level Harmful interference time period 
1 −8 𝑑𝐵 ≤ 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 < 9𝑑𝐵 Warning 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1𝑚𝑖𝑛 Warning 
2 −9 𝑑𝐵 ≤ 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 < −10𝑑𝐵 Remunerative 
penalty 
1 < 𝑡 ≤ 2𝑚𝑖𝑛 Remunerative penalty 
3 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 = −10 𝑑𝐵 Punitive penalty 2 < 𝑡 ≤ 4𝑚𝑖𝑛 Punitive penalty 
4  𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 > −10 𝑑𝐵 Forfeiture 
Proceeding 
guidelines 




Table 1: Ways of implementing Graduate Response  in Spectrum Sharing 
There are many ways to implement the “three strikes” or graduated response idea in spectrum sharing 
and it depends on the agreement between PU and SU. Table 1 shows two of the graduated response 
techniques, .  Here, the agreement could require dividing the power limits into three levels, or the time 
period of the harmful interference. Or it may combine both ways for more efficiency. The first column in 
table 1 shows when the agreement requires dividing the power limits into three levels.  
1- If the SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level reaches -8 dB, the PU will not lose any data 
because this power level is less than the harmful level. The enforcer will send a warning to the SU. 
When the SU receives the warning, it would have the chance to:  
a. Disconnect SU-mobile device, 
b. Send a message to lower its power, 
c. Or transfer SU-mobile device to alternative band.  
2- If SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level reaches -9dB it could still receive the PU’s data because 
this power level is less than the harmful level. The enforcer would start penalizing each SU-mobile 
device using the remunerative penalty approach. If penalty values exceed the forfeiture maximum 
limit of $160,000, the enforcer would go to the second strike. When the SU receives the warning, 
it would have the chance to:  
a. Disconnect SU-mobile device, 
b. Send a message to lower its power, 
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c. Or transfer SU-mobile device to alternative band. 
3- If SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level reaches -10dB, the PU might start losing data because 
this power level reached the harmful level. The enforcer would upgrade the penalties from 
remunerative to punitive penalties. When the SU receives the penalties, it would have the chance 
to:  
a. Disconnect SU-mobile device, 
b. Send a message to SU-mobile devices to lower its power, 
c. Or transfer SU-mobile device to alternative band. 
4- If SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level is exceeds -10dB or the punitive penalty values exceed 
the forfeiture maximum limit of $160,000. The enforcer would go to the third strike to 
conditionally suspend the SU license.   
The enforcer could use the same procedure in the second column of table 1 but the time of conducting 
the harmful interference is used instead of the power level. For the purpose of this paper, we will follow 
one type of interference and compare it with the ex-post-only enforcement that is using the remunerative 
penalty. 
The SU may not agree with these steps because they are not covered by the statute. SU may argue with 
that because the Communications Act of 1934 section 501 ordered the maximum general penalty “if any 
person willfully and knowingly does or cause suffer to be done any act, matter, or thing omits or fails to 
do any act, matter, or thing in this Act required to be done, or willfully and known causes or suffers such 
omission or failure, shall upon conviction thereof, be punished for which no penalty more than $10,000”. 
In that case, it is the policymaker of CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee to recommend such an update 
to the Communications Act of 1934. Or, the enforcer could update the procedures to: 
1- If SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level reaches -8 dB. The PU will not lose any data because 
this power level is less than the harmful level. The enforcer will send a warning to the SU. When 
the SU receive the warning, it will have the chance to:  
a. Disconnect SU-mobile device, 
b. Send a message to lower its power, 
c. Or transfer SU-mobile device to alternative band.  
2- If the SU-mobile device transmitting SINR level reaches -9dB, the PU’s data could still be received 
because this power level is less than the harmful level. The enforcer will start penalizing each SU-
mobile device using remunerative penalty approach.  
3- If the SINR reaches -10dB or the remunerative penalty values exceeds the forfeiture maximum 
limit of $10,000, the enforcer will go to the second strike of using punitive penalty approach. 
When the SU receive these penalties, it will have the chance to:  
a. Disconnect SU-mobile device, 
b. Send a message to lower its power, 
c. Or transfer SU-mobile device to alternative band. 
4- If it is  
a. The first time for the SU to exceeds -10 dB, and if the penalty values exceeds the maximum 
forfeiture penalty value of $160,000 or if SU does not stop transmitting, the enforcer 
would have the authority to conditionally suspend the SU license.   
b. Repeated actions by the SU, and if the penalty value exceeds the maximum forfeiture 
penalty value of $1,575,000 or if SU does not stop transmitting, the enforcer would have 
the authority to conditionally suspend the SU license.  
In addition, the graduated response approach would cost more than the remunerative approach because 
it requires a more advanced adjudication system. The advanced adjudication system would, however, 
have an ex-post components that could efficiently and effectively adjudicate claims of interference. 
9. Conclusion  
Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a cooperative spectrum sharing scheme is of significant 
importance since spectrum sharing will without doubt result in interference events. This paper evaluated 
the role of the ex-post enforcement approach. It did so by using a hypothetical scenario of the 
recommended protection zones and the entities involved analyze the current enforcement timing 
measures and evaluate the usage of ex-post-only enforcement measures. The issue with the 
recommended ex-post enforcement measures by the CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee is that they are 
suitable for static spectrum allocation policy but are not applicable for cooperative spectrum sharing. In 
fact they might reduce the incentives for the SU to share the spectrum. Two main points of view were 
given, which were regulatory and technical points.  
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommended that PU and SU enter into a specific MOU or 
individual agreement to cover all specific interference enforcement issues. This recommendation would 
not be an ideal recommendation because it would be under the umbrella of the Communications Act of 
1934 and the Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines. In addition, the Forfeiture Proceeding guidelines did not 
consider the time period of conducting the harmful interference. The time period of the harmful 
interference is needed when imposing the penalty to cover the expenses of lost data.  
Three alternative scenarios were given using ex-post-only enforcement to show the regulator how an ex-
post-only enforcement scheme might work.  The first scenario, an adjudication system penalizes the SU 
when the interference level reaches a certain limit received at the PU’s antenna with a fine that is equal 
to the value of the lost data which is remunerative penalty approach. The remunerative penalty approach 
was used which means a fine imposed to SU that was proportional to the lost value of the lost data by the 
PU plus the enforcement costs caused by it. The remunerative penalty was imposed for each SU-mobile 
device conducting harmful interference to the PU’s received signal. The penalty also took into account the 
length of time of the interference. The benefits of using ex-post-only with remunerative approach 
suggested in [6] for the PU are: (1) PU will get the value of the lost data and can recover it, (2) PU will gain 
income from sharing the spectrum within the excluded areas, (3) the cost of building the sensors to around 
the PU’s base station to detect harmful interference is less than the one for protection zones because it 
would have less ranges. The disadvantages of using ex-post-only approach were explained and alternative 
ex-post-only scenario was explained to overcome these disadvantages. 
In the second ex-post-only enforcement scenario, an adjudication system penalizes each SU, when the 
interference level reaches a certain limit received at the PU’s antenna, with much higher amount than the 
value of the lost data which is called punitive penalty approach. This approach was given to overcome the 
disadvantages of the remunerative penalty approach. A comparison between the remunerative and 
different punitive penalty functions was given and it showed how punitive penalty is superior to the 
previous approach.     
Finally, the idea of a broader framework for evaluating the role of the ex-post-only enforcement to stop 
the SU from conducting harmful interference was put forth. This example hypothesized an adjudication 
system by an enforcer that applied different enforcement sanctions on the Secondary User (SU). The 
enforcement sanctions would be upgraded gradually in responding to the SU’s interfering behavior. The 
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ways of implementing the graduated response idea in cooperative spectrum sharing were explained 
depending on the agreement between PU and SU. The interference levels were divided into three 
different interference event levels received at the PU’s antenna.  In the first interference level, the penalty 
would be proportional to the value of lost data by the PU plus the expected increase in enforcement costs 
occasioned by it. In the second interference level, when the SU did not optimize the transmission and 
decided to continue transmitting closer to the PU’s antenna, more punitive penalties could be applied. If 
the SU then optimized transmissions, the net value of a sequence of transmissions would be positive. In 
the third interference level, when the interference exceeds the threshold that had been suggested in [1, 
10] other ex-post enforcement sanctions were suggested. The concerns of these approach were explained 
and strategies to overcome these concerns were suggested. It was also recommended that either the 
policymaker of the CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee propose an update to the Communications Act of 
1934 or adjust the procedures of adjudication to overcome these concerns. 
A comprehensive enforcement framework would include protecting the rights of the SU as well, in 
addition to having an ex-post component that can efficiently and effectively adjudicate claims of 
interference. 
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Signal Interference-To-Noise Ratio (SINR) 
The equation for the SINR can be expressed as: 
𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑖 =
𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑈 𝐺𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑆𝑈𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖
 
The signal to interference and noise ratio varies with the transmission parameters for SU. It depends on 
the distance between the PU and the SU, the received power of the PU and SU, the transmitter density, 
the antenna parameters of the SU and PU, and 𝑛𝑖 is the noise. The received power is: 
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑃𝑡(𝑑𝐵) + 𝐺𝑅(𝑑𝐵) +  𝐺𝑇(𝑑𝐵) −  𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝐵) 
Where 𝑃𝑟  is the received power, 𝑃𝑡  is the transmitted power, 𝐺𝑅 is the maximum receive antenna gain, 
𝐺𝑡 is the maximum transmit antenna gain.  
To get the received power the path loss must be found first. And to get the path loss, two equations will 
be used: 
1- Free Space Path Loss: FSPL =
4 π fc 𝑑
c
, where fc is the center frequency,  c is the speed of light, and 
𝑑 is the distance. Free Space Path Loss equation used to get the desired received power by the 
earth station.    
2- To get the path loss the COST-231 model will be used. This is a propagation model funded by the 
European COST-231program. The COST-231 propagation model can be applied to the frequency 
range (1500- 2000 MHz)11:  
𝑃𝐿 = 46.3 + (33.9 × log10(fc)) − (13.82 × log10(ht)) − a(hre) + [44.9 − 6.55 × log10(ht)]
× log10 d(i)  + C 
Where 𝑃𝐿 is the path loss, 𝑓𝑐  is the center frequency, 𝑎(ℎ𝑟𝑒) is the mobile antenna correction 
factors for the effective antenna height in dB:  
a(hre) =  {
8.29(log10 (1.54hre))
2
− 1.1    if fc ≤  300 MHz
3.2(log10 (11.75hre))
2
− 4.98   if fc > 300 𝑀𝐻𝑧
 
 ℎ𝑡𝑒 is the effective transmitter antenna height ranging from 30 to 200 meter, ℎ𝑟𝑒  is the effective 
receiver antenna height ranging from 1 to 10 meters, 𝑑 is the distance between the transmitter and 
the receiver in kilometers, and the value of 𝐶 = 0𝑑𝐵 for medium-size city and 𝐶 = 3𝑑𝐵 for 
metropolitan areas. 
3- Then to calculate the noise the following equation can be used: 
ndB =  K + To + F +  10 × log10(BW) 
  Where K is 198.6, To = 24.6dB, F is the noise figure, and BW is the bandwidth. 
 
Our Assumption for Building the Model 
We assumed: 1) the center frequency at 1702.5 MHz. 2) EIRP value includes the effects of antenna gain, 
antenna efficiencies, transmitter power, coupling and wave guide losses. And when the EIRP is known, no 
additional information about the transmitter is required. The EIRP used in the model is 8.1dBW12. 3) the 
                                                            
11  "A guide to the wireless engineering body of knowledge (WEBOK), 2d ed." Reference & Research Book News Dec. 2012. Academic 




12 This value based on the ITU-P recommendation S.A. 1026 
distance between the satellite and the earth station used 35785 km (approximately  22,236 mile). 4) Free 
Space Path Loss equation used to get the desired received power by the earth station.  
For the uplink of LTE mobile network (SU) we assumed: 1) the center frequency at 1702.5 MHz. 2) COST-
231 used to calculate the path loss to get the interfered received power. 3) C= 3 in the COST-231 because 
we are going to use it in the metropolitan area. 4) Received antenna height (ht) used 30 meters. 5) 
Transmitter height used 1.5 meter. 7) Transmitted power used 23dBm which is the highest transmission 
power for the LTE mobile phones. 7) 100,000 uniformly distributed mobile phones (SU) at a time. 
The noise value used is 0 Watt because we assume the antenna receiver is engineered to deal with and 
reject normal noise.  
 
 
 
